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
 
 
This article analyses the disciplinary offences under Part 1 of the Armed Forces Act 2006 which were 
prosecuted in the court martial between 2010 and 2015. 
 
Introduction 
 
The UK military justice system has been described as a “closed”,1 “obscure and overlooked field”2 
with the work of the court martial going largely unnoticed, at least for those outside of criminal 
defence practice. For some of us, the limit of our knowledge of that system perhaps extends to the 
famous Blackadder episode, Corporal Punishment.
3
 There, our eponymous protagonist is tried for one 
count of disobeying orders and a (somewhat legally dubious) charge of murdering General Melchett‟s 
beloved pet pigeon Speckled Jim. During the proceedings, Blackadder portrays some understandable 
concern about the extent to which his fair trial rights will be respected. Not only does his court martial 
include a dock identification,
4
 but General Melchett takes a starring role wearing all four hats of 
prosecution witness, judge, jury and executor. The court‟s distain for due process is evident from the 
start: 
 
Captain Darling for the prosecution: May it please the court, as this is an open and shut 
case, I beg leave to bring a private prosecution against the defence counsel for wasting 
the court‟s time. 
 
Judge General Melchett: Granted.  Defence counsel is fined fifty pounds for turning up.   
 
Lieutenant George for the defence: This is fun!  This is just like a real court! 
 
Despite being “just like a real court”, little attention is paid to military justice within the broader 
criminal justice systems of the UK whilst the paucity of academic literature on the practice of the 
court martial is notable. If the magistrates‟ court is the neglected younger sibling of the Crown Court 
as far as research is concerned, the court martial appears to be the long-lost second cousin; rarely seen 
or heard of. In the US, military law exists as a specific scholarly discipline yet one would be hard-
pushed to say the same of the UK. In practice, numbers of solicitors and barristers specialise in 
proceedings before the court martial but that work has not generally translated into the university. 
                                                          

 I am grateful to Andrew Cayley CMG QC, Professor David Ormerod QC and Dr Matt Fisher for their advice 
and comments on earlier drafts. 
1
 N. White, “Book Review: Murder, Mutiny and the Military: British Court Martial Cases 1940-1966” (2006) 
11(3) J.C.S.L. 511, 511. 
2
 R. Ponce de León, “The Coming of Age of Military Law and Jurisdiction in the English-Speaking Countries” 
(2010) 49 Mil. L. and L. of War Rev. 263, 269.  
3
 BBC, Blackadder Goes Forth, Episode 2 (1989). 
4
 A practice described as “improper” in Cartwright (1914) 10 Cr. App. R. 219.  
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“The academic study of military law within the United Kingdom, with its emphasis on military 
justice, has few adherents and disciples.”5  
 
What research has been done into the court martial tends to concentrate on the international legal 
aspects of the military justice system. Reflecting international law‟s status as the legal discipline à la 
mode, literature has shone light on the compliance of the military justice system with the ECHR.
6
 
Research has also examined the influence of international criminal law;
7
 an endeavour likely to 
continue as the investigations of the Iraq Historic Allegations Team reach their conclusion.
8
 Yet, this 
“flourishing status” of international law within the academy “contrasts sharply” with the relative 
scarcity of analysis of the court martial from a domestic law perspective.
9
  
 
This concentration on the relationship between international and UK military law belies the reality of 
the caseload of the courts martial since war crimes are hardly their daily business. In fact, the bread-
and-butter of the military justice system is in some ways remarkably similar to that of magistrates‟ 
and Crown courts up and down the country: common-or-garden cases of theft, actual bodily harm, 
criminal damage and so forth. However, aside from some different procedural arrangements,
10
 there is 
one striking distinction between the civilian courts and their military counterparts – a feature ably 
illustrated by the trial of Captain Blackadder. Military courts not only try offences contrary to 
ordinary English criminal law – which applies to those subject to service jurisdiction anywhere in the 
world by virtue of s.42 of the Armed Forces Act 2006 (the AFA) – but also a series of substantive 
disciplinary offences, such as disobeying orders.
11
  
 
The AFA was the culmination of a series of reforms designed to remedy violations of the ECHR 
found by the court in Strasbourg from the late 1990s onwards. In a succession of cases, the high water 
mark of which was Findlay v United Kingdom,
12
 aspects of the military justice system were found to 
                                                          
5
 G. Rubin, “Why Military Law? Some United Kingdom Perspectives” (2007) 26 University of Queensland L.J. 
353, 353, cf G. Rubin, “United Kingdom Military Law: Autonomy, Civilianisation, Juridification” (2002) 65 
M.L.R. 36, 36. 
6
 E.g. A. Lyon, “Two swords and two standards” [2005] Crim. L.R. 850; A. Lyon, “After Findlay: a 
consideration of some aspects of the military justice system” [1998] Crim L.R. 109; D. Richards “Appeal against 
Court Martial sentences: has anything changed?” [1999] Crim. L.R. 480; J. Cooper, “Procedural Due Process, 
Human Rights and the Added Value of the Right to a Fair Trial” [2006] 11(1) J.R. 78, 89 et seq; R. Ponce de 
León, “The Coming of Age of Military Law and Jurisdiction in the English-Speaking Countries” (2010) 49 Mil. 
L. and L. of War Rev. 263, 270 et seq. 
7
 E.g. R. Kerr, “A Force for Good? War, Crime and Legitimacy: The British Army in Iraq” (2008) 24(4) 
Defense & Security Analysis 401; G. Simpson, “The Death of Baha Mousa” (2007) 8 Melbourne J.I.L. 340; N. 
Rasiah, “The Court-martial of Corporal Payne and Others and the Future Landscape of International Criminal 
Justice” (2009) 7 J.I.C.J. 177. 
8
 See Iraq Historic Allegations Team, Quarterly update July-September 2015, November 2015, 
https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/478806/20151120-
Quarterly_Update_website_Final.pdf [accessed 28 June 2016]; Service Prosecuting Authority, Annual report 
2014/5, http://spa.independent.gov.uk/linkedfiles/spa/427088spareport_aw_web_lr.pdf [accessed 28 June 2016], 
pp.4-5 and 16-7. 
9
 G. Rubin, “Why Military Law? Some United Kingdom Perspectives” (2007) 26 University of Queensland L.J. 
353, 353. The only exception to this seems to be military legal history on which more has been written. 
10
 See below at XX. 
11
 Under part 17 of the AFA, a small number of offences which can be committed by civilians are also 
punishable by the civilian courts, such as aiding and abetting desertion.  
12
 (22107/93) (1997) 24 E.H.R.R. 221. 
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be in violation of the right to a fair trial
13
 and the right to liberty.
14
 The AFA, which introduced “wide-
ranging and fundamental changes”,15 has three key features. First, the Act aimed to ensure compliance 
with the ECHR.
16
 Secondly, it engineered the unification of the justice system across all three 
services. Previously, the Army, Royal Navy and Royal Air Force were each subject to different laws 
and procedures; by contrast, the AFA created a single prosecuting authority, and a common set of 
offences to which service personnel would be subject.
17
 Thirdly, the AFA sought to align the court 
martial with the civilian criminal courts insofar as possible: “[b]y this Act Parliament has attempted to 
apply to the military, procedures, rules and sentences drawn directly from the civilian justice 
system.”18 One substantive exception to this is the disciplinary offences criminalised under the AFA.  
 
Under Part 1 of the Act, the court martial has jurisdiction over scores of disciplinary offences which 
can be committed by military personnel subject to service law, or in some cases, by civilians subject 
to service jurisdiction.
19
 I refer to these offences throughout this article as „disciplinary offences‟ by 
contrast with „civilian crimes‟ by which I mean offences contrary to ordinary English criminal law.20 
Many of these disciplinary offences have no civilian equivalent because “Parliament has decided that 
certain disciplinary offences that do not constitute criminal behaviour in civilian life are nevertheless 
to be punished as such in a Service context”.21 This is unsurprising given the dependence of the 
military on the maintenance of discipline and the importance of upholding hierarchical authority,
22
 
which many of the disciplinary offences seek to do. The effect is to make the court martial a “hybrid 
jurisdiction”, exercising both criminal and disciplinary power in a manner unknown in other 
professions where those functions are split between the criminal courts and other regulatory bodies.
23
 
                                                          
13
 E.g. Findlay v UK (22107/93) (1997) 24 E.H.R.R. 221; Cable v UK (2000) 30 E.H.R.R. 1032; Moore v UK 
(2000) 29 E.H.R.R. 728, [2000] E.L.R. 124; Morris v UK (38784/97) (2002) 34 E.H.R.R. 52, [2002] Crim. L.R. 
494; Grieves v UK (57067/00) (2004) 39 E.H.R.R. 2, [2004] Crim. L.R. 578; Thompson v UK (36256/97) 
(2005) 40 E.H.R.R. 11; Martin v UK (40426/98) (2007) 44 E.H.R.R. 31. 
14
 E.g. Hood v UK (27267/95) (2000) 29 E.H.R.R. 365, (2000) E.L.R. 112; Thompson v UK (36256/97) (2005) 
40 E.H.R.R. 11. See also P. Camp, “Military pre-trial custody” [2001] Crim. L.R. 459; P. Camp, “Close arrest 
for military defendants – time for change?” [1998] Crim. L.R. 646. 
15
 D. Richards, “The Armed Forces Act 2006 – civilianising military justice?” [2008] Crim. L.R. 191, 192.  
16
 Service Prosecuting Authority, First Report and Business Plan, January 2009, 
http://spa.independent.gov.uk/linkedfiles/spa/report2008.pdf [accessed 28 June 2016], p.9; C. Gale, 
“Disciplinary uniformity in uniform: a success of the Human Rights At 1998?” [2008] J.C.L. 170; S.S. Strickey, 
“„Anglo-American‟ military justice systems and the wave of civilianization: will discipline survive?” [2013] 
Cambridge J.I.C.L. 763, 785. 
17
 D. Richards, “The Armed Forces Act 2006 – civilianising military justice?” [2008] Crim. L.R. 191, 197; C. 
Gale, “Disciplinary uniformity in uniform: a success of the Human Rights At 1998?” [2008] J.C.L. 170, 176; L. 
McGowan, “Criminal law legislation update” [2007] J.C.L. 99, 99. 
18
 D. Richards, “The Armed Forces Act 2006 – civilianising military justice?” [2008] Crim. L.R. 191, 192. See 
also A. Munt, “All change on the court martial front!” [2009] Archbold News 7, 7; S.S. Strickey, “„Anglo-
American‟ military justice systems and the wave of civilianization: will discipline survive?” [2013] Cambridge 
J.I.C.L. 763, 786. 
19
 There are some other disciplinary offences in other parts of the AFA and in other legislation (such as the 
Armed Forces Act 1991 s.18(8) and s.20(9) and the Reserve Forces Act 1996 ss.95-7) but most are now 
incorporated into Part 1 of the AFA 2006.  
20
 The AFA uses the term “service offence” to explain which offences can be tried by the court martial. By 
virtue of s.50(2), “service offence” includes both disciplinary and ordinary civilian criminal offences. 
21
 Guidance on Sentencing in the Court Martial, Version 4, JAG/MCS, October 2013, para. 6.3. 
22
 P Rowe, “Military Misconduct during International Armed Operations: „Bad Apples‟ or Systemic Failure?” 
(2008) 13(2) J.C.S.L. 165, 166; Ministry of Defence, Manual of Service Law: JSP 830, 
https://www.gov.uk/government/collections/manual-of-service-law-msl#manual-of-service-law-jsp-830 
[accessed 28 June 2016], vol.1, ch.1, para.9(a).  
23
 Love [1998] 1 Cr. App. R. 458, 462. 
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That said, the designation of these offences as „disciplinary‟ should not be taken to imply that they are 
insignificant or unimportant: they amount to crimes for the purposes of the enhanced protections of 
article 6 of the ECHR
24
 since all of them may be punished by imprisonment and ten of them attract a 
punitive potential life sentence.  
 
The aim of this article is to examine the operation of the court martial in respect of these disciplinary 
offences. It does so by undertaking a doctrinal and empirical analysis of the prosecutions for offences 
contrary to Part 1 of the AFA in the period January 2010 to April 2015. The results of every court 
martial during that period of time have been made publicly available by the Ministry of Defence as 
part of the government‟s “transparency and open data initiative”.25 The article begins by examining 
the dataset released by the Ministry of Defence, including the limitations of the data, and the 
procedure by which defendants arrive at the court martial. This is significant because, as with the 
civilian criminal justice system, there are a number of filters in place which serve to curtail the cases 
which come to court. Subsequently, the article examines a number of findings from the data, 
including annual prosecution rates, the most common offences charged, the number of charges laid 
against each defendant, the spread of defendants across the three services, and conviction rates. As 
these findings are discussed, the article provides substantive doctrinal analysis of a number of these 
offences given their potential novelty to some readers.  
 
Court Martial Results January 2010 to April 2015 
 
The dataset of court martial results released by the Ministry of Defence is a spreadsheet providing for 
each defendant their rank, service, trial court, sentencing date, charge(s), verdict for each charge, and 
(where applicable) sentence. The data is anonymous so it is not generally possible to identify specific 
defendants, although in some instances this can be deduced.
26
 Also missing from the dataset is any 
record of pleas so who was convicted after trial and who pleaded guilty is unknown, although data 
from elsewhere suggests that contested trials are a minority.
27
 The information provided relates only 
to the number of individuals prosecuted and not the number of cases or trials as the dataset does not 
identify which defendants were tried together. In addition, ethnographic data about the age, gender or 
ethnic background of those military personnel subject to proceedings is excluded.
28
  
 
The data covers results (i.e. date of sentence or acquittal) from January 2010 to April 2015 – five 
years and four months. Since the disciplinary offences under the AFA came into force in October 
2009,
29
 the dataset includes some historic cases brought under the old tripartite legislation: the Army 
                                                          
24
 See the test set out in Engel v The Netherlands (5100/71) and others (1979-80) 1 E.H.R.R. 647 at [82] and 
also Cooper v United Kingdom (48843/99) (2004) 39 E.H.R.R. 8, [2004] Crim. L.R. 577 and Bell v United 
Kingdom (41534/98) (2007) 45 E.H.R.R. 24. 
25
 Ministry of defence, Court martial results from the military court centres, 
https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/court-martial-results-from-the-military-court-centres [accessed 28 
June 2016]; Ministry of defence, Court martial results from the military court centres: January 2010 to April 
2015, https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/425580/20150501-
Court_Martial_Results_Jan2010-Apr2015_MCSOM-O.csv/preview [accessed 28 June 2016].  
26
 See below at XX. 
27
 Service Prosecuting Authority, Annual Report 2014/5, 
http://spa.independent.gov.uk/linkedfiles/spa/427088spareport_aw_web_lr.pdf [accessed 28 June 2016], p.13. 
28
 For the cases against civilians documented in the dataset, their gender and whether the defendant is a youth 
can be deduced from their titles. 
29
 Armed Forces Act 2006 (Commencement No. 5) Order SI 2009/1167 art. 4. 
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Act 1955, the Air Force Act 1955 and the Naval Discipline Act 1957. In some cases, it is possible to 
identify these old charges because the nomenclature of the offence has changed (for example, the 
offence of drunkenness under section 43 of the Army Act 1955 is now the offence of unfitness or 
misconduct through alcohol or drugs contrary to section 20 of the AFA). In other cases, because the 
name of the offence remained the same, it is not possible to tell whether the charges were brought 
under the new or the old legislation. In the discussion of the offences below, charges for the same type 
of mischief (albeit brought under different legislation) have been combined and referred to by the new 
nomenclature. 
 
The data does not reflect the full extent of known offending within the services because of processes 
which serve to limit those cases which come before the court martial. Procedurally, the commanding 
officer has certain responsibilities when the suspicion that a disciplinary offence has been committed 
is brought to their attention.
30
 As the Ministry of Defence explains, commanding officers “are at the 
very heart of the Service Justice System with appropriate disciplinary and administrative powers over 
all personnel under their command.”31 These officers (or commanders to whom this duty has been 
delegated) have the power to initiate proceedings for some offences (provided the suspect is “(a) an 
officer of or below the rank of commander, lieutenant-colonel or wing commander; or (b) a person of 
or below the rank or rate of warrant officer”32). Of those disciplinary offences criminalised under Part 
1 of the AFA, commanding officers may try them all summarily with the exception of the offences 
contrary to: section 1 (assisting an enemy); section 2 (misconduct on operations); section 3 
(obstructing operations); section 5 (failure to escape etc.); section 6 (mutiny);  section 7 (failure to 
suppress mutiny); section 8 (desertion); section 31 (hazarding of ship); section 32 (giving false air 
signals etc.); section 33 (dangerous flying etc.); and sections 37 and 38 (various prize offences
33
). In 
addition, the offences contrary to section 4 (looting); section 16 (malingering); and section 30 
(allowing escape, or unlawful release, of prisoners etc.) may only be dealt with summarily in certain 
circumstances.
34
 
 
On being informed that a disciplinary offence may have been committed, the commanding officer has 
a duty to refer the matter to the service police if it is a Schedule 2 offence (i.e. relatively serious) or, if 
                                                          
30
 The procedure for civilian crimes differs in that, where committed in England and Wales by those subject to 
service jurisdiction, the civilian courts and the court martial have concurrent jurisdiction. A protocol between 
the Director of Public Prosecutions and the Director of Service Prosecutions determines which jurisdiction deals 
with the case: Protocol on the Exercise of Criminal Jurisdiction in England and Wales between the Director of 
Service Prosecutions and the Director of Public Prosecutions and the Ministry of Defence (2011), 
http://spa.independent.gov.uk/linkedfiles/spa/test/about_us/publication_scheme/20111007-
juris_eng_and_wales.pdf [accessed 28 June 2016]. 
31
 Ministry of Defence, Manual of Service Law: JSP 830, https://www.gov.uk/government/collections/manual-
of-service-law-msl#manual-of-service-law-jsp-830 [accessed 28 June 2016], vol.1, ch.1, para.2(b). See also S.S. 
Strickey, “„Anglo-American‟ military justice systems and the wave of civilianization: will discipline survive?” 
[2013] Cambridge J.I.C.L. 763, 764. On the definition of „commanding officer‟ see Ministry of Defence, 
Manual of Service Law: JSP 830, https://www.gov.uk/government/collections/manual-of-service-law-
msl#manual-of-service-law-jsp-830 [accessed 28 June 2016], vol.1, ch.2.  
32
 AFA s.52(3). The powers differ depending on the identity of the suspect, the status of the commanding officer 
and the potential charge. See Ministry of Defence, Manual of Service Law: JSP 830, 
https://www.gov.uk/government/collections/manual-of-service-law-msl#manual-of-service-law-jsp-830 
[accessed 28 June 2016], vol.1, ch.6, parts 3, 4 and 5 and ch.2 and J. Blackett, Rant on the Court Martial and 
Service Law (Oxford: OUP, 2009), para. 1.28-9. 
33
 The concept of „prize‟ developed historically in relation to the seizure of the spoils of war by the victorious 
party. Prize offences therefore address misconduct in the course of taking prize. 
34
 AFA s.53(1). 
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not, to either involve the police or ensure that the offence is otherwise investigated.
35
 If the service 
police investigate and consider that there is sufficient evidence to charge, they have a duty to refer the 
case to the Director of Service Prosecutions (DSP) if it is a Schedule 2 offence or certain other 
prescribed circumstances exist.
36
 All other cases are referred back by the police to the commanding 
officer.
37
 That officer then has the power to either deal with the matter summarily or refer it to the 
DSP themselves.
38
 In consequence, “[i]t seems clear that the amendments in 2006 delineated „serious 
matters‟ – to be kept free from the chain of command – from [minor] „discipline matters‟ that could 
be handled within the unit.”39 In circumstances where the commanding officer decides to deal with the 
case, the defendant may be tried by that officer at a summary hearing, where limited penalties can be 
imposed.
40
 Such cases are not recorded in the dataset and do not appear to be publicly available. This 
is potentially significant because it appears that, for some disciplinary offences, the cases brought 
before the court martial are merely the tip of the iceberg. For example, it has been reported that 800 
personnel from the Army went absent without leave in 2010,
41
 yet the dataset shows only 186 
defendants prosecuted at the court martial that year. This suggests that perhaps three-quarters of those 
going absent without leave were either not charged with the offence at all (perhaps because of 
evidential problems or public interest reasons not to prosecute) or were tried summarily by their 
commanding officer. In consequence, the dataset provides only a partial picture of service offending. 
 
To further complicate matters, in cases where the commanding officer is willing to proceed 
summarily, a defendant has a right to elect trial by court martial instead;
42
 a system that is far more 
favourable to the defence than the civilian equivalent because the right to elect applies to all 
disciplinary (and civilian criminal) offences not merely either-way ones. Where the defendant does 
not elect and is therefore tried by their commanding officer at a summary hearing, there is a right to 
appeal against conviction and/or sentence by way of rehearing at the Summary Appeal Court.
43
 
Whether a case is tried by the court martial – and subsequently appears in the dataset – is therefore 
                                                          
35
 AFA ss. 113-115, s.128, sch. 2 and the Armed Forces (Part 5 of the Armed Forces Act 2006) Regulations SI 
2009/2055. Simply put, the more serious the offence, the more likely it is that referral will be necessary. 
36
 AFA s.116(2). Those circumstances being, in brief, repeat offences of threats/violence; serious injury or death 
of a subordinate or someone whom the defendant was under a duty to safeguard; or a death in custody: Armed 
Forces (Part 5 of the Armed Forces Act 2006) Regulations SI 2009/2055 reg.5. 
37
 AFA s.116(3). See also D. Richards, “The Armed Forces Act 2006 – civilianising military justice?” [2008] 
Crim. L.R. 191, 201. 
38
 AFA s.119 and s.120. 
39
 S.S. Strickey, “„Anglo-American‟ military justice systems and the wave of civilianization: will discipline 
survive?” [2013] Cambridge J.I.C.L. 763, 785. 
40
 AFA s.124, s.132 and s.133. 
41
 Ministry of Defence, British military personnel AWOL figures 2006 to 2014, 16 June 2014, 
https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/320963/20140616-
Military_Awol_Figures_2006-2014.pdf [accessed 28 June 2016]. Frustratingly, other sources suggest different 
figures including some which could be well in excess of 800: cf Ministry of Defence, Number of military 
personnel going AWOL (absent without leave) for each year 2004 to 2014, 21 August 2014, 
https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/348103/20140821_Armed_Force
s_AWOL_2004_2014.pdf [accessed 28 June 2016] and Ministry of Defence, AWOL Stats 2000-2010 including 
Prosecution and Sentences for Desertion, 4 November 2010, 
https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/awol-stats-2000-2010-including-prosecution-and-sentences-for-
desertion [accessed 28 June 2016].  
42
 AFA s.129. 
43
 AFA s.141. See also P. Rowe, “A New Court to Protect Human Rights in the Armed Forces of the UK: The 
Summary Appeal Court” (2003) 8(1) J.C.S.L. 201. 
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determined by decisions made by the police, commanding officer and the defendant, whilst cases tried 
summarily are hidden from public view.  
 
Where the case is referred to the DSP for prosecution or the defendant elects trial by court martial, 
matters proceed in a similar manner to those in the civilian courts. Like the Crown Prosecution 
Service, the Service Prosecuting Authority applies evidential sufficiency and public interest tests in 
determining whether to prosecute. However, in the military justice system, the public interest test is 
supplemented by a “service interest” test. As the Authority explains “[t]he Service interest requires 
the maintenance of good order and discipline within Her Majesty‟s Forces. Discipline is essential to 
the maintenance of morale and the maintenance of morale is a key component of operational 
effectiveness.”44 The application of these tests and the discretion afforded to the DSP therefore also 
serve to limit the cases tried by court martial. 
 
At trial, in lieu of a jury, the court martial usually takes place before a board, consisting of a judge 
advocate and between three and seven lay members who will generally be officers or warrant 
officers.
45
 The rules of evidence broadly reflect those in the civilian criminal courts.
46
 Unlike in the 
civilian system, simple majority verdicts are permitted
47
 and, unless a civilian is on trial, the board 
collectively decides on sentence.
48
 Oddly, “[t]he Court Martial is required to pass a separate sentence 
in respect of each offence … except where the trial was at the election of the defendant, in which case 
one global sentence for all offences is passed”.49 Appeal against conviction and/or sentence by the 
court martial is to the Court Martial Appeal Court – in essence, the Court of Appeal (Criminal 
Division) sitting with a different hat. The Appeal Court has generally adopted a deferential attitude 
towards the court martial
50
 – particularly in respect of sentencing for disciplinary offences which have 
no civilian equivalent. After all, “the Court Martial is a specialist criminal court. That does not mean 
that we [the Appeal Court] accept blindly the decision of the Court Martial, but we must attach due 
respect to a court which is designed to deal with service issues.”51  
 
Despite this deference some appeals against conviction or sentence are of course successful although 
the dataset does not appear to have been amended to reflect that success. For example, only one 
defendant in the dataset was convicted of murder: a sergeant in the Royal Marines sentenced on 6 
December 2013. These proceedings are presumably those against Alexander Blackman for the murder 
of an injured Afghan combatant. However, the dataset records that this defendant was sentenced to 
imprisonment for life with a minimum term of ten years – Blackman‟s original sentence, which on 
                                                          
44
 Service Prosecuting Authority, First Report and Business Plan, January 2009, 
http://spa.independent.gov.uk/linkedfiles/spa/report2008.pdf [accessed 28 June 2016], p.16 and p.13. 
45
 AFA s.155-7. For the procedure generally see Armed Forces (Court Martial) Rules SI 2009/2041 and Armed 
Forces (Court Martial) (Amendment) Rules SI 2013/1851. 
46
 J. Blackett, Rant on the Court Martial and Service Law (Oxford: OUP, 2009), para.1.42. 
47
 Permitting simple majority verdicts has been held not to breach article 6: Twaite [2010] EWCA Crim 2973, or 
article 14: Blackman [2014] EWCA Crim 1029, [2015] 1 W.L.R. 1900. 
48
 AFA s.160. 
49
 Guidance on Sentencing in the Court Martial, Version 4, JAG/MCS, October 2013, para. 2.13. AFA s.255, 
s.165 and sch. 3A. The consequence of this is that determining from the dataset which charges attracted which 
penalties is exceptionally difficult. 
50
 D. Richards, “Appeal against Court Martial sentences: has anything changed?” [1999] Crim. L.R. 480, 481-2. 
51
 Glenton [2010] EWCA Crim 930 at [19]. See also McKendry [2001] EWCA Crim 578 at [12]; Limbu [2012] 
EWCA Crim 816 at [23]; Tointon [2010] EWCA Crim 1781 at [6]; Calverly [2014] EWCA Crim 1738 at [12]; 
Love [1998] 1 Cr. App. R. 458; and Yard [2013] EWCA Crim 2147 at [21]. 
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appeal was reduced to eight years.
52
 It seems therefore that the dataset should be taken to represent the 
result of the case at the court martial, rather than the final outcome of the proceedings overall. 
 
The results in the dataset originate from five different court centres in the UK, one in Cyprus and one 
at Sennelager in Germany. The relatively high workload of the last of the three (some 718 defendants 
in the relevant period) reflects the fact that the largest regular military presence of UK forces overseas 
is in Germany.
53
 The NATO Status of Forces Agreement 1951 gives the UK authorities “the right to 
exercise within the receiving State [Germany] all criminal and disciplinary jurisdiction conferred on 
them by the law of the sending State [the UK] over all persons subject to the military law of that 
State”.54 At the same time, Germany possesses a concurrent jurisdiction over UK forces where 
offences are committed on German territory and contrary to German law.
55
 In cases of concurrent 
jurisdiction, the treaty makes arrangements for the jurisdiction of one state to take primacy, for 
example, where the offence is one of violence by a member of the UK military against another, the 
jurisdiction of the UK authorities would take precedence.
56
 In other cases, “the authorities of the 
receiving State shall have the primary right to exercise jurisdiction”.57 In principle, this could mean 
that UK military or civilian personnel who commit offences against locals in Germany could be tried 
by the German authorities. However, the 1959 Supplementary Agreement to the Status of Forces 
Agreement granted a “general waiver of jurisdiction by the German authorities … in favour of the 
British military legal system”.58 This waiver may be disapplied “in any serious case of particular 
German public interest”.59 In practice, this allows “most servicemen and servicewomen and members 
of the civilian component [of the UK military] to be dealt with in [UK] service courts even when the 
complainant is a German national”,60 although there have been cases where British service personnel 
have been tried in the German system.
61
 Each state also has exclusive jurisdiction over offences which 
are contrary to its law but not the law of the other state.
62
 Similar provisions under the Treaty 
Concerning the Establishment of the Republic of Cyprus 1960 apply in relation to the two UK 
sovereign bases there
63
 but comparatively fewer defendants are tried there by the court martial (19 in 
the period covered by the dataset). Cases prosecuted by the German or Cypriot authorities are of 
course not included in the court martial results.  
 
Annual Prosecutions for Disciplinary Offences 
 
                                                          
52
 Blackman [2014] EWCA Crim 1029, [2015] 1 W.L.R. 1900.  
53
Ministry of Defence, UK Defence in Numbers, August 2015, 
https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/467482/20151013-
UK_Defence_in_Numbers_screen.pdf [accessed 28 June 2016], p.10. 
54
 NATO Status of Forces Agreement 1951 art. VII(1)(a). 
55
 NATO Status of Forces Agreement 1951 art. VII(1)(b). 
56
 NATO Status of Forces Agreement 1951 art. VII(3). 
57
 NATO Status of Forces Agreement 1951 art. VII(3)(b). 
58
 P. Rowe, “The Trial of Civilians under Military Law: An Empirical Study” (1995) 46 N.I.L.Q. 405, 406; 
NATO Supplementary Agreement to the Status of Forces Agreement 1959 art. 19. 
59
 P. Rowe, “The Trial of Civilians under Military Law: An Empirical Study” (1995) 46 N.I.L.Q. 405, 406. 
60
 P. Camp, “Post-trial bail for civilians in military courts - time for change?” [1998] Crim. L.R. 123, 123-4; R. 
Beddard, “The right to a fair trial in the services” [1998] E.L.R. HR49, 51.  
61
 G. Witzsch, “Article VII NATO Status of Forces Agreement: Some Decisions by German Courts” (1970) 9 
Mil. L. & L. War Rev. 409. 
62
 NATO Status of Forces Agreement 1951 art. VII(2)(a) and (b). 
63
 Treaty Concerning the Establishment of the Republic of Cyprus 1960 annex C, s.8. 
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During the period January 2010 to April 2015, a total of 2,759 defendants were charged before the 
court martial. Of those, 48% of defendants (1,337) were charged with at least one disciplinary offence 
under Part 1 of the AFA.
64
 Year-on-year, the number of defendants prosecuted for disciplinary 
offences was as follows: 
 
Year (to end 
of March) 
Number of defendants charged with 
at least one disciplinary offence 
2010/11 336 
2011/12 287 
2012/13 201 
2013/14 233 
2014/15 220 
 
This finding is broadly consistent with the reports of the Service Prosecuting Authority in respect of 
numbers of proceedings for both disciplinary and civilian criminal offences, which show fewer courts 
martial in recent years.
65
 The causes of the decline from 2010/11 are unclear. Fewer cases might 
reflect the broader social trend of falling crime levels, or illustrate that the AFA has had the effect of 
reducing the number of cases which reach the court martial – perhaps because commanding officers 
are dealing with more cases at summary hearing, or because the Service Prosecuting Authority is 
bringing fewer proceedings than the tripartite service prosecutors it replaced.  
 
Common and Uncommon Charges 
 
As would be expected, some offences appear more commonly before the court martial than others. Of 
course, the frequency with which certain offences are prosecuted does not necessarily reflect their 
prevalence within the services because the number of other cases being tried summarily by 
commanding officers (assuming the offence is one that is so triable) is unknown. Nonetheless, the 
different disciplinary offences with which defendants were charged before the court martial and the 
number of charges laid are illustrated in the graph below: 
 
Prosecutions of military personnel for disciplinary offences contrary to Part 1 of the AFA  
(January 2010 to April 2015) (charges = 2292)
66 
                                                          
64
 For the purpose of analysing the disciplinary offences which follow, 22 defendants were removed from the 
sample because of anomalies or ambiguities in the records, for example, where the description of the charges 
was unclear or the number of verdicts did not match the number of charges. It is not possible to check the 
original sources to ensure the accuracy of the data. 
65
 Service Prosecuting Authority, Annual Report 2014/5, 
http://spa.independent.gov.uk/linkedfiles/spa/427088spareport_aw_web_lr.pdf [accessed 28 June 2016], p.13. 
C.f. Service Prosecuting Authority, First Report and Business Plan, January 2009, 
http://spa.independent.gov.uk/linkedfiles/spa/report2008.pdf [accessed 28 June 2016], p.38; CPS Inspectorate,  
The Service Prosecuting Authority, December 2010, http://www.justiceinspectorates.gov.uk/crown-prosecution-
service/wp-content/uploads/sites/3/2014/04/SPA_Dec10_rpt.pdf [accessed 28 June 2016], p.11. 
66
 These figures exclude the civilians who were prosecuted during this period. The number of defendants is 
higher because defendants charged with more than one disciplinary offence are counted for each offence. 
Offences which were not prosecuted at all are excluded from the graph. 
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As the graph shows, defendants most commonly appear before the court martial charged with 
deserting (contrary to section 8) or going absent without leave (AWOL) (section 9).
67
 Evidently, these 
offences are significant because they impact upon the “operational effectiveness” of the armed 
forces.
68
 As the Court Martial Appeal Court has explained, an absent individual “not only lets down 
his comrades in arms and undermines their morale generally, his conduct either exposes another 
Service man or woman sent to replace him to the risks that he is avoiding; or, if he is not replaced, by 
depleting their numbers, he exposes those in war theatres to even greater risks than those they already 
face.”69  
 
                                                          
67
 The offences had the same names under the old tripartite legislation. See Army Act 1955, s.37 and s.38; Air 
Force Act 1955, s.37 and s.38 and Naval Discipline Act 1957, s.16 and 17.  
68
 Guidance on Sentencing in the Court Martial, Version 4, JAG/MCS, October 2013, para. 6.6.2. 
69
 Glenton [2010] EWCA Crim 930 at [22]. 
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The offence of being absent without leave has a number of forms: those intentionally or negligently 
absent commit an offence.
70
 Further, those who do (a) “an act, being reckless as to whether it will 
cause him to be absent without leave; and (b) it causes him to be absent without leave” are also 
criminalised.
71
 In either case, the maximum penalty is two years‟ imprisonment.72 The offence of 
absence without leave differs from desertion in that, in the latter case, the defendant‟s absence is 
aggravated by one of two additional features: either intended permanence or avoidance of active 
service. For the first type of desertion, those absent and intending to remain permanently so may be 
subject to a sentence of up to two years‟ imprisonment.73 As Avins explains, “[t]hat intent may be 
entertained for only a brief time, and then abandoned, but if formed at all it poses the danger that the 
accused will never return. It is this danger of permanent deprivation of the serviceman‟s service that 
the statute is designed to guard against.”74 For the second form of desertion, those absent and 
intending to avoid active service (even if temporarily) are subject to a potential penalty of life 
imprisonment.
75
 For these purposes, ““active service” means service in– (a) an action or operation 
against an enemy; (b) an operation outside the British Islands for the protection of life or property; or 
(c) the military occupation of a foreign country or territory.”76 A conscientious objection and article 9 
of the ECHR have been held not to provide a defence to charges of going absent without leave or 
desertion.
77
 Whilst members of the UK military are, of course, no longer conscripts, applications for 
conscientious objection are not as rare as one might imagine.
78
 The prevalence of the offences of 
desertion and absence without leave might suggest that numbers of recruits (whether conscientious 
objectors or otherwise) sign up in haste and repent at leisure. 
 
The next most common sections under which defendants are charged are section 20 (unfitness or 
misconduct through alcohol or drugs), section 15 (failure to attend or perform a duty), and section 21 
(fighting or threatening behaviour). Like absence without leave and desertion these are all offences 
criminalising conduct which is damaging to operational effectiveness. A specific offence of unfitness 
or misconduct through drugs or alcohol was created by section 20 of the AFA.
79
 This offence is 
committed by military personnel who are “unfit to be entrusted” with any duty, or whose “behaviour 
is disorderly or likely to” discredit the forces, and the reason for this behaviour or unfitness is the 
“influence of alcohol” or drugs.80 “Unfitness”, in this context, means that the person‟s ability to 
perform a duty is “impaired”.81 For this offence “successfully to be prosecuted, it is unnecessary to 
                                                          
70
 AFA s.9(2). 
71
 AFA s.9(3). 
72
 AFA s.9(5). 
73
 AFA s.8(2)(a) and s.8(4)(b). 
74
 A. Avins, “The Development of the Concept of Military Desertion in Anglo-American Law” (1963-4) 4 
Melbourne U. L. Rev. 91, 110. 
75
 AFA s.8(2)(b) and s.8(4)(a). 
76
 AFA s.8(3). 
77
 Khan v Royal Air Force Summary Appeal Court [2004] EWHC (Admin) 2230, [2004] H.R.L.R. 40. 
78
 See, for example, Ministry of Defence and Advisory Committee on Conscientious Objectors,  Conscientious 
Objectors Policy, 3 November 2010, https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/conscientious-objectors  
[accessed 28 June 2016] and Ministry of Defence and Advisory Committee on Conscientious Objectors,  
Conscientious Objectors 1970 to 2011, 30 March 2011, 
https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/conscientious-objectors-1970-2011 [accessed 28 June 2016].  
79
 This replaced the previous offences of drunkenness contrary to the Army Act 1955 s.43; Air Force Act 1955 
s.43; and Naval Discipline Act 1957 s.28. 
80
 AFA s.20(1).  
81
 AFA s.20(1A). 
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demonstrate that the defendant was drunk, merely that he was under the influence of drink.”82 After 
all, “[t]his is in a service context. If an individual, for example, the morning after an evening of ill-
judged merriment, awakens hungover, his ability to do his duty may be compromised. His safety and 
that of others who depend upon him may consequentially be compromised.”83 The maximum penalty 
is again two years‟ imprisonment.84 
 
Where the unfitness or misconduct is caused by drugs rather than alcohol, there are exceptions to the 
offence if the drug was taken on medical advice and any directions complied with; if the drug was 
taken for medicinal purposes and there was no reason to believe impairment would follow; or if the 
drug was taken or administered on the orders of a superior officer.
85
 This means that those with 
legitimate reasons for taking a drug but who experience unexpected side effects would not be caught 
by the provisions. The defendant bears the evidential burden in respect of these exceptions.
86
 The 
Armed Forces Act 2011 amended the AFA to add a new companion offence of exceeding the alcohol 
limit for prescribed safety-critical duties – in essence, an offence akin to drink-driving but with the 
driving replaced by certain specified duties which entail a risk of death or serious injury to persons, or 
serious damage to property or the environment.
87
 Examples of such specified duties include ensuring 
the safe conduct or navigation of a ship, piloting an aircraft, handling explosives, etc.
88
 There were no 
charges of exceeding the alcohol limit for prescribed safety-critical duties in the dataset – perhaps 
unsurprisingly given that the offence only came into force 18 months before the end of the period 
covered.
89
 
 
Under section 15(1) of the AFA, an offence is committed through the failure to attend for any duty, 
leaving any duty before being permitted, or failure to perform any duty.
90
 These forms of the offence 
are subject to a defence of reasonable excuse, for which the defendant again carries an evidential 
burden.
91
 An offence is also committed by the negligent performance of any duty.
92
 Collectively, 
these provisions encompass a broad spectrum of mischief: “from [the] very minor (such as a minor 
bureaucratic failure), through conduct the consequences of which are very expensive (such as failure 
to carry out the correct navigation procedures leading to a ship running aground), to the most serious 
where the failure or negligence leads to serious injury or loss of life.”93 Indeed, leaving a duty can be 
as minor as failure to be in one‟s room during a notified inspection.94 At the more serious end of the 
scale, a recent case involved the fatal injury of a solider by the accidental discharge of a gun during a 
training exercise. There, the Court Martial Appeal Court held that in determining negligence the 
requisite standard of care is an objective test, “to be measured against the standard to be expected of 
                                                          
82
 Rabouhi [2014] EWCA Crim 1517 at [15].  
83
 Rabouhi [2014] EWCA Crim 1517 at [15]. 
84
 AFA s.20(5). 
85
 AFA s.20(3)(a) and s.20(2). 
86
 AFA s.20(4). 
87
 AFA s.20A. 
88
 Armed Forces (Alcohol Limits for Prescribed Safety-Critical Duties) Regulations SI 2013/2787 regs. 4 and 5. 
89
 1 November 2013: Armed Forces Act 2011 (Commencement No. 4) Order SI 2013/2501 art. 3. 
90
 Under the previous legislation, similar offences existed under the Army Act 1955 s.29A and s.41; Air Force 
Act 1955 s.29A and s.41 and Naval Discipline Act 1957 s.7. 
91
 AFA s.15(1) and s.325. 
92
 AFA s.15(2). 
93
 Guidance on Sentencing in the Court Martial, Version 4, JAG/MCS, October 2013, para. 6.11.1. 
94
 Scallan [2005] EWCA Crim 2040. 
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the reasonable serviceman having similar training, knowledge and experience as the accused.”95 The 
maximum penalty for the offences contrary to section 15 is two years‟ imprisonment.96  
 
Oddly, given the expansive array of offences against the person punishable under civilian criminal 
law, section 21(1) makes fighting, without reasonable excuse, a specific disciplinary offence.
97
 The 
justification for this duplication is that “[t]he essence of fighting is the disturbance of good order, and 
this offence is very different from the criminal offence of assault, the essence of which is an attack on 
a victim.”98 In that sense, the offence seems designed to cover conduct in which both participants are 
equally culpable: “[t]he charge of fighting is not brought where the force used amounts to a one-sided 
attack because that would not be a fight in the ordinary meaning of the word in the statute, that is, a 
struggle or conflict.”99 Yet, in some such cases, the conduct would arguably be consensual rough 
horseplay.
100
 Whilst there does not seem to be any specific case law addressing the point, the defence 
of “reasonable excuse” could presumably encompass a plea of consent. This suggests that, in order for 
the defendant to be convicted, there would need to be sufficient injury sustained such that consent 
could no longer apply.
101
 Yet, the mischief which the offence seeks to address appears to be precisely 
the fact that it cannot be in the interests of order and discipline to have service personnel engaging in 
(consensual) physical fights with each other, even if no injuries result. In addition to fighting, section 
21 includes provisions similar to those in section 5 of the Public Order Act 1986: it is a disciplinary 
offence to behave in a manner threatening, abusive, insulting or provocative and likely to cause a 
disturbance.
102
 The mens rea is intention or knowledge that the behaviour may be threatening, 
abusive, insulting or provocative.
103
 Again, there is a defence of reasonable excuse.
104
 These 
disciplinary offences are subject to a maximum penalty of two years‟ imprisonment.105  
 
By contrast with these common offences, various provisions of the AFA have seen little or no use 
during the period covered by the dataset. There was only one prosecution for the series of 
miscellaneous offences related to ships and aircraft criminalised under sections 31 to 38 of the AFA. 
In that case a flight lieutenant was charged with two counts of the offence contrary to s.33(2) which 
provides that “[a] person subject to service law commits an offence if, negligently, he does an act – 
(a) when flying or using an aircraft, or (b) in relation to an aircraft or aircraft material, that causes or 
is likely to cause loss of life or injury to any person.”106 The maximum penalty is two years‟ 
imprisonment.
107
 Similarly, there was only one case of obstructing a service police officer. Under 
section 27 of the AFA, it is an offence to intentionally obstruct or fail to assist a service police officer 
acting in the course of his duty or a member of the military exercising authority on behalf of a provost 
                                                          
95
 Price [2014] EWCA Crim 229, [2014] 1 W.L.R. 3501 at [20]. 
96
 AFA s.15(3). 
97
 Under the previous legislation: Army Act 1955 s.43A, Air Force Act 1955 s.43A and Naval Discipline Act 
1957 s.13. 
98
 Guidance on Sentencing in the Court Martial, Version 4, JAG/MCS, October 2013, para. 6.15.1. 
99
 Guidance on Sentencing in the Court Martial, Version 4, JAG/MCS, October 2013, para. 6.15.1. 
100
 It is perhaps no coincidence that the leading authority here is from the Court Martial Appeal Court: Aitken 
[1992] 1 W.L.R. 1006. 
101
 Brown [1994] 1 A.C. 212. 
102
 AFA s.21(2)(a). E.g. Johnson [2005] EWCA Crim 2934. 
103
 AFA s.21(2)(b). 
104
 AFA s.21(2)(a). 
105
 AFA s.21(4). 
106
 Previously the offence of dangerous flying etc: Army Act 1955 s.49; Air Force Act 1955 s.49; Naval 
Discipline Act 1957 s.20. 
107
 AFA s.33(4)(b). 
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officer. The defendant must know or have “reasonable cause to believe that that person is a service 
policeman or a person exercising authority on behalf of a provost officer”.108 The offence is again 
punishable by a sentence of up to two years‟ imprisonment.109 
 
In the same vein, malingering was charged only twice. This offence is committed where a defendant, 
to avoid service, causes, aggravates, prolongs, has another cause or pretends to have an injury.
110
 
Where a person causes, aggravates or prolongs the injury of another, at the injured party‟s request and 
with the intention of enabling them to avoid service, that too is an offence.
111
 Injury, for these 
purposes, “includes any disease and any impairment of a person‟s physical or mental condition”.112 
By way of illustration of this phenomenon, it is apparently “a known method of evading continuance 
of military service” for a member of the services to ask someone else to break their arm in order to be 
released from duty.
113
 In one extreme case, the defendant went so far as to persuade “a friend to run 
over his leg as he did not want to go to Afghanistan.”114 Again, the maximum penalty is two years‟ 
imprisonment.
115
  
 
Other offences are even rarer and some have never been prosecuted. This, of course, does not 
necessarily mean that such conduct never occurs – not least because prosecutors may always rely 
upon the most generic of all the offences in the AFA, namely conduct prejudicial to good order and 
discipline.
116
 This offence requires an act or an omission prejudicial to good order and service 
discipline and, as with many other disciplinary offences, attracts a maximum penalty of two years‟ 
imprisonment.
117
 In Dodman,
118
 the Court Martial Appeal Court explained that the prosecution is 
required to prove the conduct, that the conduct was prejudicial to both good order and to military 
discipline, and that the conduct was intentional or reckless. The court rejected the defence submission 
that the offence should be one of specific rather than basic intent, explaining that the question of 
whether the conduct is prejudicial is an objective one. It does not matter therefore whether the conduct 
is “blameworthy” i.e. whether the defendant appreciated that it would prejudice good order and 
discipline. That said, the court rather complicated matters by holding that if a mental element might 
be crucial to the prejudicial nature of the conduct (for example, conduct which where mistaken would 
not be so prejudicial, but where dishonest would be), then the defendant‟s state of mind will require 
consideration. Subsequently, it was held that whether the conduct has “the potential to become known 
to others within the military or … it was not in fact known until it was discovered on investigation” is 
                                                          
108
 AFA s.27(1)(b). Like their civilian counterparts, service police are subject to code of practice pursuant to the 
Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984: Ministry of Defence, The Service Police Codes of Practice, 19 March 
2015, 
https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/410011/20150319_SPCOP_Final
_March_2015.pdf [accessed 28 June 2016].  
109
 AFA s.27(3). 
110
 AFA s.16(1). Previously the Army Act 1955 s.42; the Air Force Act 1955 s.42 and the Naval Discipline Act 
1957 s.27. 
111
 AFA s.16(2). 
112
 AFA s.16(3). 
113
 Capill [2011] EWCA Crim 1472 at [2]. 
114
 Cross [2010] EWCA Crim 3273 at [3]. 
115
 AFA s.16(4). 
116
 This offence was previously criminalised by the Army Act 1955 s.69; the Air Force Act 1955 s.69 and the 
Naval Discipline Act 1957 s.39. 
117
 AFA s.19. 
118
 [1998] 2 Cr. App. R. 338, endorsed under the AFA 2006 in Armstrong [2012] EWCA Crim 83. See also R 
(Karol Rybarczyk) v Military District Court of Poznan Poland [2013] EWHC 180 (Admin). 
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irrelevant.
119
 Nonetheless, the conduct must be actually, rather than merely hypothetically, 
prejudicial.
120
  
 
Evidently, the parameters of this offence are potentially open ended.
121
 The jurisprudence illustrates 
that a smorgasbord of conduct has been prosecuted as prejudicial, from breaking into a theatre and 
taking works of art intending to retain them for a short period,
122
 to selling pirated DVDs,
123
 to using a 
military vehicle for one‟s own (unauthorised) purposes,124 to failing to pass on the benefit of a 
discount to troops who had pooled their money to pay for supplies,
125
 to dishonouring cheques,
126
 to 
“negligently causing the unintended discharge of a round from an Army rifle” resulting in the death of 
the soldier hit by the round.
127
 With such a broadly drafted offence, there is obvious potential for 
prosecutorial misuse since it may encompass conduct falling under any number of other disciplinary 
offences or ordinary civilian crimes.
128
 In Armstrong, the defendant was charged with four counts of 
conduct prejudicial on the basis of facts which also made out a number of serious civilian criminal 
offences. The Court Martial Appeal Court disapproved of the charges, explaining that “where conduct 
constitutes an offence under the ordinary criminal law, it must be charged as such save in wholly 
exceptional circumstances”, not least because the sentencing regime established for the civilian crime 
would otherwise be circumvented.
129
 
 
The offence of conduct prejudicial has been further criticised on three bases. First, that “charges can 
be drawn very widely to cover all kinds of conduct, including social conduct outside the military 
environment”; secondly, that “it may be too easy to … punish behaviour that may not really be 
prejudicial to good order and military discipline at all”; and “thirdly, it is very difficult for an 
individual to know in advance whether his conduct falls within the section”.130 This could mean that 
the compliance of the offence with the ECHR is questionable since article 7 prohibits retrospective 
criminalisation and incorporates a requirement for reasonable certainty in the law. The defendant must 
“know from the wording of the relevant provision and, if need be, with the assistance of the court‟s 
interpretation of it, what acts and omissions will make him liable”.131 In Armstrong the offence was 
said to be article 7 compliant, but this comment was not only obiter, it also lacked reasoning to 
support it.
132
 In Ainsworth v UK, the European Commission of Human Rights held that on the facts of 
                                                          
119
 Armstrong [2012] EWCA Crim 83 at [24]. 
120
 Office of the Judge Advocate General, Practice in the Service Courts: Collected Memoranda, Version 5(1), 6 
March 2015, „Memorandum 1 Conduct Prejudicial to Good Order and Service Discipline: AFA06 Section 19‟, 
para 1.4. 
121
 D.B. Nichols, “The Devil‟s Article” (1963) 22 Mil. L.R. 111. 
122
 E.g. Davies [1980] Crim. L.R. 582. 
123
 E.g. Appleyard [2005] EWCA Crim 2592. 
124
 E.g. Wilkinson (CA, 10th April 2000) 
125
 E.g. Holden [2005] EWCA Crim 817 
126
 G. R. Rubin, “Section 146 of the Criminal Justice and Public Order Act 1994 and the „decriminalisation‟ of 
homosexual acts in the armed forces” [1996] Crim. L.R. 393, 398; P. Camp, “Section 69 of the Army Act 1955” 
(1999) 149(6913) N.L.J. 1736. 
127
 E.g. Blaymire [2005] EWCA Crim 3019 at [7]. 
128
 P. Camp, “Section 69 of the Army Act 1955” (1999) 149(6913) N.L.J. 1736. 
129
 Armstrong [2012] EWCA Crim 83 at [21]. 
130
 P. Camp, “Section 69 of the Army Act 1955” (1999) 149(6913) N.L.J. 1736. See also E.J.D. McBrien, “An 
Outline of British Military Law” (1983) 22 Mil. L. & L. War R. 9, 14. 
131
 Kokkinakis v Greece (14307/88) (1994) 17 E.H.R.R. 397 at [52]. See also R. Clayton and H. Tomlinson, The 
Law of Human Rights (Oxford: OUP, 2009), para. 11.511. 
132
 Armstrong [2012] EWCA Crim 83 at [34]-[35]. 
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that case, it was predictable that the defendant‟s conduct would fall within the offence.133 Nonetheless, 
as a memorandum from the Judge Advocate General explains, it is evidently possible that “a specific 
charge … which contained an allegation that was not objectively prejudicial to good order and service 
discipline (that is, where a reasonable Service person could not have contemplated that the conduct 
alleged was prejudicial when he did it) might fail”.134  
 
Reliance on this „catch-all‟ offence might explain why some other disciplinary offences have seen 
little use. Those of assisting an enemy (section 1), obstructing operations (section 3), looting (section 
4), failure to escape etc. (section 5), mutiny (section 6), failure to supress mutiny (section 7), failure to 
cause apprehension of deserters or absentees (section 10), using force against a sentry etc. (section 
14), disclosure of information useful to an enemy (section 17), allowing escape or unlawful release of 
prisoners etc. (section 30), hazarding of a ship (section 31), giving false air signals etc. (section 32), 
low flying (section 34), annoyance by flying (section 35), inaccurate certification (section 36), and 
various prize offences (sections 37 and 38) do not appear to have been prosecuted before the court 
martial within the period covered by the dataset. Some of these offences (those contrary to sections 1, 
3, 5, 6, 7, 31, 32, 37 and 38) cannot be dealt with summarily by commanding officers which means 
they have not been prosecuted at all. If these sections of the AFA continue never to be invoked, either 
because prosecutors prefer alternative charges or that particular form of mischief rarely (if ever) 
occurs, one wonders whether the effort entailed by criminalisation was worthwhile. 
 
Charges per Defendant 
 
Beyond the total number of charges for each offence laid during the period covered by the dataset, it 
also seems that some offences are charged repeatedly in respect of the same defendants. For most 
offences, the average (mean) number of charges per defendant hovers between one and two. However, 
for others, the dataset shows that multiple charges are more common. This is potentially significant 
for a number of reasons: most obviously, multiple charges may indicate that particular offences are 
committed by serial offenders rather than in isolation. Alternatively, it may suggest that isolated cases 
are not reaching the court martial, perhaps because commanding officers and/or the Service 
Prosecuting Authority tend to try one-time offenders summarily, whilst sending to the court martial 
only those who show a pattern of repeated unlawful behaviour. This is potentially significant because 
we know very little about how commanding officers decide whether to proceed summarily against a 
defendant. The Manual of Service Law explains that “[a] number of factors may be relevant in 
reaching such a decision, but broadly speaking, the CO [commanding officer] will usually need to 
consider: a. The adequacy of his powers of punishment; b. The seriousness of the alleged offence; and 
c. The complexity of the case”, along with considering whether the offence “is part of an incident 
where some other offences have been referred to the DSP”.135 Beyond this, there is little information 
about how and why commanding officers decide to proceed with some charges summarily and not 
others – a factor exacerbated by the fact that statistics on summary proceedings are not publicly 
released by the Ministry of Defence. 
                                                          
133
 Ainsworth v UK (35095/97), Commission admissibility decision of 22 October 1998. 
134
 Office of the Judge Advocate General, Practice in the Service Courts: Collected Memoranda, Version 5(1), 6 
March 2015, „Memorandum 1 Conduct Prejudicial to Good Order and Service Discipline: AFA06 Section 19‟, 
para 1.3. 
135
 Ministry of Defence, Manual of Service Law: JSP 830, https://www.gov.uk/government/collections/manual-
of-service-law-msl#manual-of-service-law-jsp-830 [accessed 28 June 2016], vol.1, ch.6, para.17. See also 
para.83.  
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One offence where high numbers of charges per defendant are particularly evident is ill-treatment of a 
subordinate contrary to section 22 of the AFA. The dataset shows that 34 defendants faced 110 
charges of ill-treatment – an average (mean) of 3.2 charges per defendant. Whilst most defendants 
charged with this offence faced only one count (the mode is 1) more than half were charged with at 
least two counts and more than a third faced between three and fourteen such charges (this variance is 
reflected in the median of 2 and standard deviation of 3.1). Ill-treatment of a subordinate is a specific 
offence against the person which can only be committed by officers, warrant offices or non-
commissioned officers. It requires ill-treatment of a subordinate with the mens rea of intention or 
recklessness as to the ill-treatment and knowledge or reasonable cause to believe that the victim was a 
subordinate.
136
 The offence covers obvious examples of the use of violence,
137
 as well as matters such 
as imposing exercise as punishment to the point of illness or injury to the subordinate.
138
 Cases 
involving such ill-treatment provide prosecutors with significant discretion in respect of charges, with 
potentially significant implications for the defendant. A case involving a slap by a superior officer of 
his subordinate, for example, would in civilian criminal law terms amount to a battery. Such offence, 
of course, may be punished by up to six months‟ imprisonment,139 by contrast with a maximum 
penalty of two years‟ for the disciplinary offence.140 A key question for each case will therefore be 
whether the mischief lies in the act of violence or the violation of the relationship of trust between 
service personnel and their commanding officer.  
 
Prosecutorial policy (formal or informal) in respect of this offence might account for the wide 
variance in the number of charges laid per defendant and the high proportion of defendants facing 
more than one charge. Alternatively, this may be indicative of a tendency by commanding officers to 
refer the most serious cases (with the most allegations) to the DSP.
141
 The figures could also illustrate 
that certain forms of criminal behaviour (or at least allegations thereof) tend to be carried out 
repeatedly and systematically, by comparison with some other offences which appear more commonly 
to be isolated events. This could be particularly significant in respect of ill-treatment as it might 
suggest that, in circumstances where allegations are made that commanding officers are mistreating 
their subordinates, the accused may tend to be a serial offender.  
 
Also showing a high number of charges per defendant is the series of false records offences 
criminalised by the AFA.
142
 A person who makes an official record or adopts as his own another‟s 
record, knowing it to be materially false and knowing or having reasonable cause to believe that the 
record is official, commits an offence.
143
 There are further offences of tampering with, or suppression 
                                                          
136
 AFA s.22(1). Previously Army Act 1955 s.65; Air Force Act 1955 s.65 and Naval Discipline Act 1957 
s.36A. 
137
 E.g. Smith (CA, 7th February 2000). 
138
 E.g. Skeet [2005] EWCA Crim 3412. 
139
 Criminal Justice Act 1988 s.39. 
140
 AFA s.22(3). 
141
 Whilst conduct causing serious injury to a subordinate is a prescribed circumstance which means it must be 
referred to the DSP by the service police (see above at XX), this applies even if there is only one such offence 
and therefore does not seem to account for the tendency for multiple charges: AFA s.116(2)(b) and s.128 and 
Armed Forces (Part 5 of the Armed Forces Act 2006) Regulations 2009/2055 reg. 5(b). 
142
 AFA s.18. Under the old tripartite legislation, similar offences were found under the Army Act 1955 s.62; the 
Air Force Act 1955 s.62 and the Naval Discipline Act 1957 s.35. 
143
 AFA s.18(1) and (2).  
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of, an official document with intent to deceive,
144
 and failing to make a record which one is under a 
duty to make, again, with intent to deceive.
145
 A record or document is deemed “official if it is or is 
likely to be made use of, in connection with the performance of his functions as such, by a person who 
holds office under the Crown or is in the service of the Crown.”146 The maximum penalty here is two 
years‟ imprisonment.147 An obvious example of such an offence would be providing false information 
in order to obtain an allowance to which one is not otherwise entitled.
148
 As with many of the 
disciplinary offences under the AFA, false records “offences can vary widely in seriousness, for 
instance from falsifying a booking-in sheet to make it look as though an offender booked back into 
barracks in time, to offences in relation to accounting for arms, ammunition, or large sums of money 
or quantities of supplies.”149 For these offences, 17 defendants faced 45 charges – an average (mean) 
of 2.6 charges per defendant. Again, whilst many defendants faced only one charge (the mode is 1), 
the median of 2 and standard deviation of 2.1 reflect the fact that half of the defendants faced multiple 
counts up to a high of seven such charges. Again, the high number of charges per defendant could 
indicate that allegations of this misbehaviour come in groups – perhaps because lone incidents are not 
discovered – or that multiple allegations are referred more often by the commanding officer to the 
DSP.  
 
A similar picture emerges in respect of the offence of misapplying or wasting public or service 
property.
150
 Section 26 of the AFA provides obvious definitions of service and public property and the 
penalty is anything other than imprisonment.
151
 The dataset shows that nine defendants faced a total of 
25 charges for this offence resulting in an average (mean) of 2.8 charges per defendant. However, 
closer examination reveals that the figures are being distorted by one defendant who was charged with 
the offence ten times, and another facing five charges, whilst the remainder were subject to only one 
or two charges.  
 
Charges across the Services 
 
The spread of offending across the three services is also worthy of attention. Analysis of the total 
number of defendants charged with at least one disciplinary offence shows that 87% (1159) were from 
the Army, 4% (47) from the RAF, 9% (123) from the Navy,
152
 and 1% (8) civilians.
153
 Roughly 
speaking, around 59% of the UK‟s armed forces personnel are in the Army, 21% in the RAF and 20% 
in the Navy.
154
 Whilst this headline rate therefore shows that the Army is over-represented in 
                                                          
144
 AFA s.18(3).   
145
 AFA s.18(4). 
146
 AFA s.18(5). 
147
 AFA s.18(6). 
148
 E.g. Ingram [2010] EWCA Crim 1645. 
149
 Guidance on Sentencing in the Court Martial, Version 4, JAG/MCS, October 2013, para. 6.12.2. 
150
 AFA s.25. 
151
 AFA s.25(2). This replaced some of a variety of offences under the previous legislation including Army Act 
1955 ss.44-8; Air Force Act 1955 ss.44-8 and Naval Discipline Act 1957 ss.29-33. 
152
 In this article statistics on charges against members of the Royal Marines have been included in those for 
naval personnel. 
153
 Civilians can commit some but not all disciplinary offences. See Ministry of Defence, Manual of Service 
Law: JSP 830, https://www.gov.uk/government/collections/manual-of-service-law-msl#manual-of-service-law-
jsp-830 [accessed 28 June 2016], vol.1, ch.7. 
154
 T. Rutherford, Defence Personnel Statistics, House of Commons Library, SN/SG/02183, 26 September 2014, 
p.5. The figures vary slightly over time. Exact calculations are not possible because of periodic changes in the 
methods of counting personnel. See also Ministry of Defence, UK Armed Forces Quarterly Personnel Report, 1 
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proceedings before the court martial, breaking this down by each offence illustrates a more nuanced 
pattern. The graph below illustrates the percentage of defendants from the Army, Navy and RAF who 
were charged under each section of Part 1 of the AFA:  
 
Relative proportion of defendants from each service charged with disciplinary offences contrary to Part 1 
of the AFA (January 2010 to April 2015)
155
 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
April 2015, 
https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/426880/QPR_Apr2015.pdf 
[accessed 28 June 2016], pp.5-8. 
155
 Offences where fewer than ten defendants were charged have been excluded because of the small numbers 
involved. These figures also exclude the civilians who were prosecuted during this period. Defendants charged 
with more than one section are counted for each offence. Percentages do not always summate to 100 due to 
rounding. 
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Evidently, the Army is frequently over-represented, particularly in respect of absence without leave, 
desertion, misconduct on operations and resistance to arrest. The Army‟s over-representation in 
respect of the former two offences – discussed above156 – is perhaps illustrative of the practical 
differences between the services since it is evidently more difficult to escape a ship or aircraft carrier 
that has set sail than to absent oneself from a base on dry land. Explanations in respect of the latter 
two offences, however, may not be so straight-forward.  
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Misconduct on operations
157
 is “aimed at maintaining fighting efficiency”.158 Indeed, “[t]he 
misconduct always occurs on operations and in the presence of the enemy so offences under this 
section affect directly the fighting power of the Armed Forces, and are liable to undermine the morale 
of the forces.”159 The offence may be committed in a number of ways. First, a person “commits an 
offence if, without reasonable excuse, he – (a) surrenders any place or thing to an enemy; or (b) 
abandons any place or thing which it is his duty to defend against an enemy or to prevent from falling 
into the hands of an enemy.”160 Secondly, a person “commits an offence if he fails to use his utmost 
exertions to carry out the lawful commands of his superior officers.”161 Thirdly, a person “on guard 
duty and posted or ordered to patrol, or … on watch” who “(a) without reasonable excuse… sleeps; or 
(b) (without having been regularly relieved) … leaves any place where it is his duty to be” also 
commits the offence.
162
 Fourthly, a person “commits an offence if, without reasonable excuse, he 
intentionally communicates with a person who is – (a) a member of any of Her Majesty's forces or of 
any force co-operating with them, or (b) a relevant civilian, and the communication is likely to cause 
that person to become despondent or alarmed.”163 The second, third and fourth forms of the offence 
can only be committed by someone “who is – (a) in the presence or vicinity of an enemy; (b) engaged 
in an action or operation against an enemy; or (c) under orders to be prepared for any action or 
operation by or against an enemy”.164 Under the AFA, an “enemy” includes “(a) all persons engaged 
in armed operations against any of Her Majesty‟s forces or against any force co-operating with any of 
Her Majesty‟s forces; (b) all pirates; and (c) all armed mutineers, armed rebels and armed rioters”.165 
Where a defence of reasonable excuse is permitted, the evidential burden falls on the defendant.
166
 
The offence attracts a potential life sentence.
167
  
 
One can easily imagine the most egregious illustration of misconduct on operations which might lead 
to a significant sentence of imprisonment. Nonetheless, the potential life sentence is striking for two 
reasons. First, the offence covers a remarkably wide range of conduct from – at the one end – 
“sleeping on watch” to – at the other – surrendering to an enemy.168 Secondly, it is notable that a 
defendant may be subject to a life sentence where, in the presence of an enemy, they intentionally 
communicate with “a relevant civilian” and the communication is likely to cause that person to feel 
despondent or alarmed. Aside from the risk that the offence may be one of strict liability as to result 
(there is no authority on the point), one wonders whether it would ever be possible for such a penalty 
to comply with the ECHR given the need for proportionality when interfering with the right to 
freedom of expression.
169
   
                                                          
157
 AFA s.2. This replaced a similar offence of misconduct in action under the old tripartite legislation: Army 
Act 1955 s.24, Air Force Act 1955 s.24 and Naval Discipline Act 1957 s.2 respectively.  
158
 E.J.D. McBrien, “An Outline of British Military Law” (1983) 22(1) Military L. and L. of War Rev. 9, 14. 
159
 Guidance on Sentencing in the Court Martial, Version 4, JAG/MCS, October 2013, para. 6.5.1. 
160
 AFA s.2(1).  
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 AFA s.2(3). „Superior officer‟ is defined in s.374. 
162
 AFA s.2(4). 
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 AFA s.2(5). „Relevant civilian‟ is defined in s.2(6) as “a civilian subject to service discipline” who is 
accompanying a member of the military and that latter person is “(i) in the presence or vicinity of an enemy; or 
(ii) engaged in an action or operation against an enemy.” 
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 AFA s.374. 
166
 AFA s.325. 
167
 AFA s.2(7). 
168
 Guidance on Sentencing in the Court Martial, Version 4, JAG/MCS, October 2013, para. 6.5.1. 
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 See generally S. Turenne, “The Compatibility of Criminal Liability with Freedom of Expression” [2007] 
Crim. L.R. 866. 
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The Army is also over-represented in respect of offences contrary to section 28 of the AFA which 
covers disobeying an order for arrest, or using violence or threatening behaviour towards a person 
ordering an arrest. “Behaviour” includes things said and, again, “threatening” is not limited to threats 
of violence.
170
 The maximum penalty for these offences is two years‟ imprisonment.171 It is unclear 
why Army personal appear to be charged with these offences before the court martial proportionately 
more often than those from the other services.  
Meanwhile, the Navy, which is under-represented in respect of most offences, is significantly over-
represented in cases of misconduct towards a superior officer, unfitness or misconduct through 
alcohol or drugs
172
 and disobedience to lawful commands. Sections 11 to 13 of the AFA create a 
series of offences of insubordination designed to maintain the military‟s disciplinary structures, since 
“[t]he integrity and effectiveness of the Armed Forces rely on obedience and respect to those in 
authority.”173 First is the offence of misconduct towards a superior officer.174 This involves three 
different forms of conduct aimed at a superior officer: the use of violence, threatening behaviour or 
disrespectful behaviour,
175
 and the defendant must know or have reasonable cause to believe that the 
victim is a superior officer.
176
 Behaviour includes communication to the superior officer whether or 
not made in the officer‟s presence,177 so would therefore presumably cover matters such as sending 
one‟s commanding officer abusive emails. Using violence has been interpreted to cover indirect 
contact such as pouring a pint of beer over the victim
178
 whilst “threatening” again has a wider 
definition than just threatening violence.
179
 The distinction between behaviour which is threatening 
and that which is merely disrespectful is potentially significant because cases involving disrespectful 
behaviour may be punished by up to two years‟ imprisonment whilst an offence involving threatening 
behaviour or the use of violence attracts a penalty of up to ten years.
180
 
 
Next, the offence contrary to section 12 is committed where a defendant intentionally or recklessly 
disobeys a lawful command,
181
 and is punishable again by up to ten years‟ imprisonment.182 A 
defendant who, for example, refuses an order to go to bed commits the offence – even when the order 
contains crude language.
183
 The courts have held that a prosecution for refusal to obey a lawful 
command pending an appeal on the grounds of conscientious objection did not violate the right to 
freedom of thought, conscience and religion under article 9 of the ECHR.
184
 The finding that the Navy 
is over-represented in respect of disobeying lawful commands contrary to section 12 of the AFA is 
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 AFA s.28(3)(a) and (b). 
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 AFA s.28(4). 
172
 See above at XX. 
173
 Guidance on Sentencing in the Court Martial, Version 4, JAG/MCS, October 2013, para. 6.7.1. 
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 Previously the offence of insubordinate behaviour: Army Act 1955 s.33; Air Force Act 1955 s.33; Naval 
Discipline Act 1957 s.11. 
175
 AFA s.11(1) and (2). 
176
 AFA s.11(1)(b) and (2)(b). 
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178
 Singh [2005] EWCA Crim 958. 
179
 AFA s.11(3)(b). 
180
 AFA s.11(4). 
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 The offence had the same name prior to the AFA: Army Act 1955 .s34; Air Force Act 1955 s.34; Naval 
Discipline Act 1957 s.12. 
182
 AFA s.12(2). 
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 Knott (CA, 10th April 2000). 
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 Lyons [2011] EWCA Crim 2808, [2012] 1 W.L.R. 2702. 
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curious given that the Navy is under-represented in the statistics on contravention of standing orders 
contrary to section 13. Yet, but for potential penalties, the two offences are remarkably similar. The 
latter requires the contravention of a lawful order of which the defendant knows or could reasonably 
be expected to know.
185
 It applies to standing or routine and continuing orders made for any part of 
the armed forces or any area, place, ship, train or aircraft.
186
 Again, this means it covers a wide range 
of conduct with differing degrees of seriousness.
187
 Examples of such standing orders include those 
which cover similar conduct on military bases as that covered by the Road Traffic Act 1988 on public 
roads,
188
 those prohibiting possession of anabolic steroids,
189
 those prohibiting financial dealings 
between military training staff and their students,
190
 those designating certain areas “out of bounds”,191 
and the “no touching rule” which often applies on Navy ships.192 The maximum penalty for this 
offence is two years‟ imprisonment.193 
 
The RAF meanwhile is consistently under-represented across all offences. Of course, the dataset does 
not permit qualitative analysis which would fully explain these findings. It is possible that they may 
indicate a particular predilection by some services for certain disciplinary offences, or that in some 
respects army personnel are ill-disciplined by comparison with their naval and aerial counterparts. On 
the other hand – and perhaps more likely – these statistics may illustrate that different services have 
adopted different internal practices towards the treatment of some of these offences. In respect of a 
number of them (such as absence without leave contrary to section 9, misconduct towards a superior 
officer contrary to section 11, resistance to arrest etc. contrary to section 28, unfitness or misconduct 
through alcohol or drugs contrary to section 20, disobedience to lawful commands contrary to section 
12 and contravention of standing orders contrary to section 13) the commanding officer has discretion 
to deal with these charges summarily. It may be that commanding officers in some services are more 
reluctant to do this, resulting in more charges from that service being prosecuted by the DSP at the 
court martial. Similarly, it may be that defendants in some services are more willing to elect trial by 
court martial than be tried by their commanding officer – perhaps because of different cultures within 
those services or expectations about treatment after summary trial. 
 
Conviction Rates 
 
Finally, the disciplinary offences prosecuted at the court martial show significant variance in their 
conviction rate (i.e. the percentage of charges resulting in conviction). Of the 1,329 military 
defendants charged with at least one disciplinary offence, 12% (159) were either acquitted of all 
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 AFA s.13(1). Under the old legislation, the offence was entitled „disobedience to standing orders‟: Army Act 
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charges or had the entire proceedings discontinued.
194
 In consequence, 88% (1169) of defendants were 
convicted of at least one disciplinary charge. This figure is broadly consistent with the conviction rate 
for all types of offences (i.e. civilian criminal and disciplinary) reported by the Service Prosecuting 
Authority for the period 2010-2015 which was 86%.
195
 When calculated on the basis of charges rather 
than defendants (i.e. the number of all disciplinary charges resulting in a guilty verdict), the 
conviction rate is 85%. However, as the graph below illustrates, when separated for each section 
under the AFA, the conviction rate by charge varies from 100% to 29% depending on the offence 
charged:  
 
Percentage of charges resulting in conviction for disciplinary offences contrary to Part 1 of the AFA  
(January 2010 to April 2015)
196  
  
 
The offence with the highest conviction rate is misconduct on operations at 100%, albeit only 12 
individuals were so charged.
197
 The offences with the next highest conviction rates were absence 
without leave (98%), desertion (84%) and unfitness or misconduct through alcohol or drugs (83%). 
Disobedience to lawful commands and contravention of standing orders also both had a conviction 
                                                          
194
 Another one had their case referred to their commanding officer. 
195
 Service Prosecuting Authority, Annual Report 2014/5, 
http://spa.independent.gov.uk/linkedfiles/spa/427088spareport_aw_web_lr.pdf [accessed 28 June 2016], p.13.  
See also CPS Inspectorate,  The Service Prosecuting Authority, December 2010, 
http://www.justiceinspectorates.gov.uk/crown-prosecution-service/wp-
content/uploads/sites/3/2014/04/SPA_Dec10_rpt.pdf [accessed 28 June 2016], p.11. 
196
 Offences where fewer than ten defendants were charged have been excluded because of the small numbers 
involved. These figures exclude the civilians who were prosecuted during this period. 
197
 See above at XX. 
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rate of 76%.
198
 After that, the offence contrary to section 24 had a conviction rate of 75%. This is one 
of two offences under the AFA covering improper use of public property.
199
 It is an offence under 
section 24 to damage or lose any public or service property, or property belonging to another person 
subject to service law. The mens rea is intention or recklessness as to the loss or damage and there is a 
defence of lawful excuse only in intentional cases.
200
 The loss of the property may be temporary.
201
 
Property “means property of a tangible nature”.202 The maximum penalty for this offence is ten years‟ 
imprisonment – the same as the civilian offence of criminal damage203 yet evidently the disciplinary 
offence is significantly broader covering matters as minor as the reckless temporary loss of a 
colleague‟s property, where culpability is low. There are further offences under section 24 of 
negligently damaging or losing public or service property, or being reckless or negligent and doing an 
act or omitting to do an act which is likely to cause loss or damage to public or service property.
204
 
This may be punished by up to two years‟ imprisonment.205 Again, the range of these offences is 
considerable, covering minor incidents of damaging low value military property to cases involving 
huge financial sums, such as crashing a military aircraft.
206
  
 
In contrast, those offences with low conviction rates include disgraceful conduct of a cruel or indecent 
kind (62%), false records offences (56%), resisting arrest etc. (41%), and ill-treatment of a 
subordinate (29%).
207
 The wide-ranging offence of disgraceful conduct of a cruel or indecent kind 
encompasses any act or omission which is cruel or indecent, and disgraceful.
208
 Again, the maximum 
penalty is two years‟ imprisonment.209 For this offence too there is obvious overlap with the civilian 
criminal law. A so-called hazing ceremony involving sexual behaviour, for example, could amount to 
both disgraceful conduct of a cruel or indecent kind and a crime of assault by penetration or sexual 
assault – both of which carry significantly longer potential sentences than the disciplinary offence.210 
As the court martial sentencing guidance explains, “[t]his [disgraceful conduct] offence is not 
intended and not adequate to deal with the situation where a sexual assault has been carried out on an 
unwilling victim”211 although commonly, the offence is charged in relation to “indecent exposure or 
indecent words … towards female personnel”.212 Appropriate charging decisions are particularly 
important here because the complainant anonymity provisions of the Sexual Offences (Amendment) 
Act 1992 do not apply to the disciplinary offence, nor do the special measures provisions for sexual 
                                                          
198
 See above at XX. 
199
 Guidance on Sentencing in the Court Martial, Version 4, JAG/MCS, October 2013, para. 6.18.2. These new 
offences cover parts of a variety of offences under the previous legislation, including Army Act 1955 ss.44-8; 
Air Force Act 1955 ss.44-8 and Naval Discipline Act 1957 ss.29-33. See above at XX for the other offence. 
200
 AFA s.24(1)(b). 
201
 AFA s.24(3)(c). 
202
 AFA s.24(3)(d). Section 26 provides obvious definitions of service and public property. 
203
 AFA s.24(4)(a); cf Criminal Damage Act 1971 s.4(2), with the exception of arson and criminal damage 
which endangers life which carry potential life sentences: s.4(1). 
204
 AFA s.24(2) and (3)(a). 
205
 AFA s.24(4)(b). 
206
 E.g. Jackson [2006] EWCA Crim 2380. 
207
 For the last three offences, see above at XX. 
208
 AFA s.23(1) and (2). Under the old tripartite legislation, disgraceful conduct was criminalised by the Army 
Act 1955 s.66; the Air Force Act 1955 s.66 and the Naval Discipline Act 1957 s.37. 
209
 AFA s.23(3). 
210
 Sexual Offences Act 2003 s.2 and s.3. 
211
 Guidance on Sentencing in the Court Martial, Version 4, JAG/MCS, October 2013, para. 6.17.1.  
212
 Guidance on Sentencing in the Court Martial, Version 4, JAG/MCS, October 2013, para. 6.17.1. See also 
Gordon (CA, 17th July 1997). 
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offences found in the Youth Justice and Criminal Evidence Act 1999.
213
 Examples of conduct which 
has been prosecuted as disgraceful include kicking and stamping a dog to death,
214
 taking photographs 
of a fellow soldier being stripped naked and assaulted,
215
 taking photographs of abuse of detainees,
216
 
sending photographs of the defendant‟s wife with offensive inscriptions to her neighbours,217 and 
touching a colleague‟s body with one‟s exposed genitals.218  
It is unclear why achieving a conviction for these offences should apparently be more difficult than 
for others. In respect of two offences – false records and ill-treatment of a subordinate – as we have 
seen,
219
 the average number of charges per defendant tended to be higher than for most other offences 
yet the conviction rate is significantly lower. This could suggest that prosecutors are overloading the 
indictments, leading to a greater percentage of acquittals than for other offences where charges are 
more focused. There are evidently a number of factors which might lead prosecutors to pursue more 
charges in these cases but one possible factor relates to the extent to which those accused display a 
pattern of unlawful behaviour rather than merely having committed an isolated offence. In light of 
this, it is interesting to calculate the conviction rate for these offences on the basis of defendants rather 
than charges (i.e. how many defendants were convicted of at least one of these charges, rather than 
how many charges resulted in conviction). For ill-treatment of a subordinate, 21 out of the 34 
defendants charged were acquitted of all charges: a conviction rate of only 38%. Therefore, the low 
number of charges resulting in guilty verdicts do not appear to be distorted by the high number of 
charges per defendant – instead, the low conviction rate must have some other explanation. In a 
context in which bullying of junior recruits by their commanding officers has become a concern in 
recent years,
220
 particularly after the recent disclosure of problems at Deepcut barracks in the 1990s, 
this is worthy of further investigation. Whether it illustrates difficulties with evidence in such cases, 
with the willingness of board members to convict (since lay members will generally be at least 
officers or warrant officers and so will have subordinates) or problems with the policy being applied 
by the Service Prosecuting Authority requires supplementary research. For the false records offences, 
whilst only 56% of charges resulted in conviction, 11 out of 17 defendants charged were convicted of 
at least one offence: an alternative conviction rate of 65%. This suggests that defendants are likely to 
be convicted of some but often not all of the charges, perhaps demonstrating that fewer charges with 
stronger evidence would be preferable. 
 
Conclusion 
 
The release of government data opens up a plethora of potentially fruitful lines of enquiry for 
academic study – particularly for research which casts light on hitherto neglected areas of the criminal 
                                                          
213
 Sexual Offences (Amendment) Act 1992 s.2 and Youth Justice and Criminal Evidence Act 1999 s.17(4), 
s.22A and s.62. 
214
 E.g. Lee [2005] EWCA Crim 62. 
215
 E.g. Wilby [2013] EWCA Crim 1417. 
216
 E.g. Bartlam [2005] EWCA Crim 1801. See the interesting discussion of the phenomenon of “war porn” by 
N. Whitty, “Soldier Photography of Detainee Abuse in Iraq: Digital Technology, Human Rights and the Death 
of Baha Mousa” (2010) 10(4) H.R.L.R. 689.  
217
 E.g. Holbrook (CA 10th April 2000). 
218
 E.g. Summers [2012] EWCA Crim 2073. 
219
 See above at XX. 
220
 See, for example, S. Ogilvie and E. Norton, Military Justice: Proposals for a Fair and Independent Military 
Justice System, Liberty, June 2014 and BBC News, Army head launches ‘crackdown’ on bullying and 
harassment, 4 September 2015, http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-34148307 [accessed 28 June 2016].  
This is the version of the article accepted for publication in Criminal Law Review published by Sweet and Maxwell 
http://www.sweetandmaxwell.co.uk/Catalogue/ProductDetails.aspx?recordid=478  
Accepted version made available by SOAS Research Online: http://eprints.soas.ac.uk/23076/  
© K Grady (2016) 
 
27 
 
justice system such as the prosecution of disciplinary offences before the court martial. As this article 
has illustrated, interrogating such data enhances our understanding of the justice system beyond the 
headline figures found in official annual reports and crime statistics. The dataset examined here 
discloses wide variations in the prevalence of charges for disciplinary offences tried at the court 
martial, with some sections of the AFA resolutely unused, and others, particularly absence without 
leave and desertion, making regular appearances. There are also discrepancies between the average 
numbers of charges faced by defendants for each offence with some more commonly subject to 
multiple charges. As we have seen, this may suggest that some offences are being committed by serial 
offenders. Analysing the proportion of defendants from each of the three services has also uncovered 
the frequency with which Army personnel are tried before the court marital and the general under-
representation of those from the Navy and RAF (with the exception of a few notable offences). 
Finally, the inconsistent conviction rates between the disciplinary offences – varying from 100% and 
29% – merits further investigation to understand the factors which contribute to such different 
outcomes.   
 
The data on the results of courts martial between January 2010 and April 2015 are part of an array of 
spreadsheets recently released by the government. Even a rudimentary search of the gov.uk website 
for crime and policing statistics instantly provides access to data on a whole range of areas interesting 
to the criminal lawyer: from statistics on drug seizures to deaths following police contact to metal 
theft to football-related arrests and banning orders, and beyond.
221
 The availability of statistics 
potentially more novel and interesting than the overall crime rate reported annually and with which 
we have become familiar has the capacity to stimulate multiple new strands of scholarly literature. 
One consequence of this could be increased public understanding and transparency in the criminal 
justice system. 
 
Whilst this would be welcome, the data has limitations. First, embarking on research involving 
government data is not without pitfalls since the information is not necessarily presented in the most 
user-friendly format and in most cases will require coding of some form to make it usable: a time-
consuming and laborious task. Secondly, transparency is weakened where only a select tranche of 
data is released, as in the case of the military justice system where court martial results are made 
public but those pertaining to proceedings brought summarily by commanding officers are not. For 
this article, that has meant that some inferences from the court martial dataset are speculative since 
only a partial picture of the system can be presented. Disclosure of the court martial results in the 
absence of summary hearing data promotes the importance of more serious cases (which are more 
likely to be tried by court martial) whilst potentially obscuring many of the more minor ones. In the 
absence of data about how many cases are being dealt with summarily and the results thereof, we 
cannot fully understand the extent of service offending nor the operation of the military justice 
system.  
 
In addition, quantitative data analysis of the type undertaken in this article of course requires 
supplementary qualitative analysis if we are to comprehend the factors which affect the statistics. In 
reducing a phenomenon such as military ill-discipline to numerical values it is important not to lose 
                                                          
221
 See 
https://www.gov.uk/government/statistics?departments%5B%5D=all&from_date=&keywords=england&page=
3&publication_filter_option=statistics&to_date=&topics%5B%5D=crime-and-policing  [accessed 28 June 
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sight of its complexity and context. As Ward cautions “[t]o many an untrained eye, figures convey a 
form of truth that is uncontestable and incontrovertible. People regard data as facts and assume that 
statistics represent reality. They view statistics as a neutral, sanitized, and objective expression of an 
unseen truth”.222 Yet this “truth” masks a whole range of diverse influences on the military justice 
system. As we have seen, further qualitative research would be beneficial – particularly to make sense 
of the discrepancies in proportionate charging between the three services, the variable conviction rates 
between different offences and the number of charges per defendant. Qualitative understanding of the 
decisions made by actors in the military justice system – along with access to more comprehensive 
quantitative data – is of particular concern because many of the disciplinary offences are legally 
complicated. As we have seen, they have multiple criminalised manifestations, often with different 
actus reus or mens rea elements, and some have specific defences. This complexity might lead us to 
question the extent to which lay persons such as commanding officers (albeit with available legal 
advice), service police and defendants (who are precluded from having legal representation at a 
summary hearing
223
) are making appropriate decisions about whether to try charges summarily or 
elect trial by court martial. Such qualitative research into decision-making in the civilian criminal 
justice system has been undertaken
224
 and equivalent research in the courts martial would extend our 
knowledge of the military justice system. This is particularly important because there is a double lack 
of transparency here. Data about cases heard before the court martial is released by the Ministry of 
Defence and those proceedings are also open to scrutiny by virtue of being public hearings.
225
 By 
contrast, information in respect of summary hearings by commanding officers is not released publicly 
and those cases take place in private, away from the public eye. How the UK military and its justice 
system treats its own personnel – especially young and potentially vulnerable recruits – has recently 
been publicly examined through the inquest into the death of Cheryl James at Deepcut barracks in 
1995.
226
 Very shortly, the military justice system is likely to be subject to further public and political 
attention for how it treated those on the outside, as decisions are made in cases involving historic 
allegations from Iraq and Afghanistan. Whilst the disclosure of the court martial results analysed in 
this article adds to public understanding and scrutiny of the military justice system, there is still much 
we do not know. 
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